Alcohol Abuse Advice

North Carolina Driving Highway Proximate Cause Alcohol Concentration Involuntary Manslaughter Culpable Negligence Plain Error Breath Lawyers Attorney

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEPHANIE MICHELLE WILLIAMS
COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

Defendant was driving back from a bar with her boyfriend.  Eatmon crossed the road in front of Defendant’s vehicle in an area not designated as a crosswalk or an intersection.  The speed limit on this part of Highway 17 was forty-five miles per hour. At the time, defendant estimated her speed was forty-five miles per hour “or maybe more.”  Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to stop her vehicle and struck Eatmon.  Defendant failed the field sobriety tests, tested positive in the preliminary breath test and admitted to having two beers.  Defendant was arrested for DWI and nearly two hours after the accident, defendant’s blood alcohol concentration measured 0.16.  Defendant was charged and indicted for DWI and involuntary manslaughter.  defendant moved to dismiss the charges due to insufficiency of the evidence at the close of the State’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both motions.  Defendant appeals.

ISSUES:

Did the State fail to present substantial evidence that the Defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of Eatmon’s death?
Did the trial court commit plain error by failing to instruct the jury on insulating acts of negligence despite substantial evidence of Eatmon’s negligence?

 

DISCUSSION:

In the instant case, the State presented evidence that from 10:30 p.m. on 18 August 2006 until 1:40 a.m. on 19 August 2006, defendant consumed five beers and three shots of liquor. Shortly thereafter, defendant drove an SUV in the northbound lane of Highway 17 in Jacksonville, North Carolina, and struck and killed Eatmon, a pedestrian who was attempting to cross the highway. When officers of the JPD arrived on the scene, they noted that defendant’s eyes were red and detected an odor of alcohol on her breath. Defendant then performed poorly on a number of field sobriety tests. Nearly two hours after the accident, her blood alcohol concentration still measured 0.16, which is twice the legal limit. The Court ruled that the State presented substantial evidence that defendant willfully violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1.  Violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 constitutes culpable negligence as a matter of law. Once culpable negligence has been established, the jury is responsible for determining if a defendant’s culpable conduct is a proximate cause of the victim’s injury and must decide guilt or innocence on that basis. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and appropriately allowed the jury to determine if defendant’s violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1 was a proximate cause of Eatmon’s death.

A trial court is not required to give an instruction on insulating acts of negligence unless the evidence at trial is sufficient to support such an instruction.  In the instant case, evidence was presented that Eatmon was intoxicated and that he attempted to cross a highway, at night, in an area that was not a designated crosswalk. Defendant contends that these actions would have led to Eatmon’s death, regardless of whether defendant was intoxicated. However, defendant did not request nor did the trial court give the jury an instruction on insulating acts of negligence.  Although the instruction given in the present case does not incorporate all parts of the jury instruction on insulating acts of negligence, it would only have allowed the jury to find defendant guilty if Eatmon’s negligence was not the sole cause of his own death. Accordingly, the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on proximate cause.  Moreover, the evidence in the instant case was insufficient to support such an instruction on insulating acts of negligence. While Eatmon’s actions were undeniably negligent, the record does not contain evidence sufficient to allow a jury to find that Eatmon’s negligence was the sole cause of his death.  There was no evidence of tire marks or braking on the highway in the area of the accident. Defendant’s impairment, which was twice the legal limit two hours after the accident, undoubtedly inhibited her ability to exercise due care to keep a reasonable and proper lookout in the direction of travel.  As a result, the evidence presented at trial showed that Eatmon’s negligence was not the sole cause of his death, but rather, at most, a concurring proximate cause.

JUDGMENT:

Defendant received a fair trial free from error.

Disclaimer:

These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group.  They represent the firm’s unofficial views of the Justices’ opinions.  The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content